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FACTS
The parties are the states of Kansas
and Colorado, who now have been
litigating about the proper allocation
of the waters of the Arkansas River
Basin for more than a century.
Cases of this sort fall within the
Article III, Section 2 constitutional
grant of original jurisdiction in suits
"in which a State shall be a Party."
In this iteration of the litigation,
Kansas, the downstream state,
ISSUE
Do federal statutes, in particular 28
U.S.C §1821(b) and 28 U.S.C.
§1920, govern the award of costs for
expert-witness appearance fees in
cases tried pursuant to the original
jurisdiction of the United States
Supreme Court?
of the groundwater and surface-
water flows in the basin and subse-
quently appeared before the Special
Master in hearings conducted in the
case. Kansas is seeking to have costs
taxed for those witnesses' atten-
dance at hearings reimbursed at the
amount paid; Colorado seeks to
apply a statutory limit found in 28
U.S.C. §1821(b) of $40 per day for
witness fees taxed as costs.
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by Robert If. Abrams
The current dispute focuses on
those taxed costs. More specifically,
the states disagree on how costs
should be calculated for the appear-
ance fees of the expert witnesses
who designed the computer model
This is, one would hope, the tail end
of the century-long litigation
between Kansas and Colorado over
the Arkansas River. In this most
recent round of litigation in the
Supreme Court, Kansas won a ruling
that groundwater pumping in
Colorado improperly depleted the
flow of the Arkansas River by
428,005 acre-feet over a 46-year
period culminating in 1996. The
Court entered judgment for more
than $34 million. Colorado has
since paid this amount. Addition-
ally, jhe Court, when it announced
its 2004 judgment, remanded the
case to the Special Master, Arthur
Littleworth, for a determination
of costs.
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Kansas and Colorado
have long disputed water
rights to the Arkansas
River. After two trips to
the Court, the states
eventually entered into
a water-rights compact.
In spite of this, post-
compact groundwater
pumping in Colorado
depleted the river's flow
and led to this current
round of litigation.
Kansas proved Colorado's
violation of the compact.
Now, in settling the
award of costs, Kansas
is seeking full
reimbursement for
expert-witness
appearance fees.
Colorado supports the
Special Master's ruling
that those fees are
limited to a federal
statutory amount.
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alleged that Colorado was violating
the 1949 interstate compact the
states had reached, by withdrawing
groundwater in amounts so great
that the flows of the river were
depleted to Kansas's detriment and
in violation of amounts assured
Kansas by the compact. The case
was assigned to a Special Master for
taking of evidence and filing of a
report. Kansas prevailed on the mer-
its, which resulted in an award of
damages against Colorado for its
past under-delivery of water, an
injunction that required the ground-
water withdrawals to be considered
in calculating compact compliance
in the future, and, as a prevailing
party, the award of costs. As to the
costs, the case was remanded to the
Special Master for a recommenda-
tion on the amount of costs to be
taxed against Colorado.
In the main, the parties were able to
agree on the bill of costs, and the
Special Master approved and recom-
mended the agreed amount to the
Court. In that agreement, however,
the parties expressly reserved the
right of "taking exception to the
legal issue decided by [the Special
Master's) Orders, and their subse-
quent inclusion in a Decree [of the
Court]." One legal determination
that the Special Master was called
upon to make in taxing the costs
was the rate to be paid for the
attendance of expert witnesses at
the hearings. The usual practice in
the federal system is governed by
statutes that appear in Title 28 of
the United States Code, but as more
fully described below, the applicabil-
ity of those statutes to proceedings
in the Supreme Court is not
expressly ordained. Kansas sought
to have those witness-appearance
fees taxed at their actual cost, while
Colorado sought application of the
statutory fee of $40 per day. The
Special Master, in his Fifth and Final
Report, opted for the statutory
amount. Kansas thereupon exer-
American Bar Association
cised its reserved right to take
exception, and that ruling relating
to the proposed bill of costs
returned to the Supreme Court as a
contested matter.
Superficially, it would seem that the
difference between actual amount
and $40 per day would be signifi-
cant, but not enough so as to pre-
vent a compromise when the alter-
native to compromise is another
round of briefing and argument in
the United States Supreme Court.
That, however, is not the case. The
proceedings before the Special
Master were protracted, to say the
least, involving 270 days of hearings
spread over a 13-year period. Those
hearings included the introduction
of more than 2,900 exhibits.
Moreover, a key element in the dis-
pute was the hydrogeologic model-
ing of the basin and the model's cal-
culation of past under-deliveries of
water by Colorado as well as future
employment of the model to calcu-
late the impact on delivery obliga-
tions of future groundwater with-
drawals in Colorado. Due to the
centrality of the model, experts
were needed in almost every facet of
the hearings.
As a result of the extensive use of
experts in the hearings before the
Special Master, the difference
between an actual cost figure for
expert-witness attendance that
Kansas is seeking and the statutory
$40-per-day figure that Colorado is
seeking is the difference between
$9,214,727.81, and $162,927.94 (a
difference of $9,051,799.87). That
disparity in potential taxed costs
explains why this litigation is
continuing.
CASE ANALYSIS
This case presents a single issue. If
Kansas were to try to state the issue
in a manner favorable to its side,
the issue would be whether taxed
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costs for expert-witness appearance
fees in Supreme Court proceedings
are governed by congressionally
enacted statutes that do not specifi-
cally mention the Supreme Court,
or whether they are to be set by the
Court as part of its inherent power
when performing its constitutionally
vested original jurisdiction. The
final phrasing is the nub of the argu-
ment-the special status of cases
within the constitutionally vested
original jurisdiction is a basis for
making the separation of powers
argument that "Congress lacks the
constitutional authority to dictate
the procedures the [Supreme] Court
will apply in original jurisdiction
cases." Kansas Sur-Reply at 1. That
line of argument also counsels a
narrow reading of the statutes,
which do not expressly mention the
Supreme Court as covered by their
provisions.
Colorado would frame the issue as
being whether procedural federal
statutes relating to mundane mat-
ters such as costs addressed to
"Courts of the United States" are
also applicable to the Supreme
Court. Colorado is seeking applica-
tion of a very specific provision that
states, "a witness shall be paid an
attendance fee of $40 per day for
each day's attendance." 28 U.S.C.
§1821(b). A prior subsection had
announced that the section is
applicable in "any court of the
United States" which is further ref-
erenced and defined in 28 U.S.C.
§451 which expressly includes the
Supreme Court as a "court of the
United States." Kansas attempts to
counter by noting that the general
statute on taxing costs, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1920, uses the phrase "[aliud,ge
or clerk of any court of the United
States," [emphasis added) which
language fails to include justices,
and therefore does not intend to
include the Supreme Court within
its purview.
(Continued on Page 190)
SIGNIFICANCE
This is a case of modest signifi-
cance. Any precedent set by the
Court will be applicable only to cas-
es within its original jurisdiction.
That jurisdiction is not very exten-
sive, encompassing slightly more
than one hundred cases in two-plus
centuries. Many of those cases are
of the state-versus-state variety, and
many of those cases, like water
apportionments or boundary dis-
putes, are likely to involve signifi-
cant reliance on experts. If the
Court rules in favor of Kansas, this
ruling will place an added economic
premium on being the prevailing
party.
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